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Notes and Comments
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: The Commerce Clause and the
Political Process
"The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered."
1
I. Introduction
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
2
the United States Supreme Court recognized that the built-in
restraints provided in our system of congressional lawmaking are
the principal limitations on the federal commerce power. 3 In em-
phasizing the political process as a safeguard against encroach-
ments upon state sovereignty,' the Court held that municipal
transit workers were not exempt from coverage under the mini-
mum wage5 and maximum hour6 provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).7 The Court thereby overruled National
1. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). U.S. CONST. amend. X states:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
2. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
3. Id. at 1020. This idea was first expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824):
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many
other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which
they have relied, to secure them from its abuse.
Id. at 197.
4. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
5. Fair Labor Standards Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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League of Cities v. Usery,8 which held that certain state and
municipal employees were exempt from the FLSA wage and
hour protections because Congress' commerce power was not so
broad as to "directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions."9 In Garcia, a five-to-four Court held that affording state
employees wage and hour protections "contravened no affirma-
tive limit on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause." 10 In
doing so, the Court refused to recognize any tenth amendment
limitation on the federal government's commerce clause power, a
long-dormant limitation which had its modern genesis in the
National League of Cities case."
Part II of this Note examines early decisions interpreting
the scope of the commerce clause. Part III discusses the lower
court decisions in Garcia, both of which held that the tenth
amendment constituted a bar against extension of Congress'
power to regulate certain state government employees under the
commerce clause. Part IV sets forth the Supreme Court's deci-
sion and the dissenting opinions. Part V analyzes the opinion,
focusing on the use of political safeguards to prevent overreach-
ing by Congress under the commerce clause and the Court's ab-
dication of its duty to review congressional actions that might
interfere with state sovereignty. Finally, Part VI concludes that
the Court has abdicated its proper role of reviewing congres-
8. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
9. Id. at 852.
10. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
11. Id. at 1007. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52. In Garcia the
Court returned to a policy it had followed, with few deviations, since two early landmark
decisions: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (where the national
government is acting under one of its enumerated powers, it is supreme within that
sphere) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (a federal statute regulating
commerce that concerns more than one state supercedes a monopoly granted by a single
state). Prior to 1937 the Court found limitations on Congress' power to regulate under
the commerce clause. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (ac-
tivities of a sugar manufacturing monopoly regulable by state pursuant to its police
power, not by federal regulation under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act since manufacturing
was held not to involve interstate commerce); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (federal wage and hour regulations for coal miners under the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 held unconstitutional because the Constitution does not grant
to Congress the power to regulate for the promotion of the general welfare, and Congress
has no power to regulate the conditions in which coal is produced before it becomes an
article of commerce).
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sional decisions for the possibility of overreaching, the very role
that the Framers intended the Court would play.
II. Background Law
A. The Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause, and Regulation
of a State Entity
1. Commerce Clause: Unifying Tool for the National
Government
The fundamental issue of allocating power between the fed-
eral government and the individual states predates the Constitu-
tion."2 At the Constitutional Convention, debates over the allo-
cation of power between the states and the federal government
were heated.'3 Thus, the Constitution that resulted was purpose-
fully vague so as to guarantee its acceptance. 4 As a result, the
12. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248 n.8 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
also, W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1908) ("The
question of the relation of the States to the federal government is the cardinal question
of our constitutional system."). This was the key issue during the writing of the Articles
of Confederation. See M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, 161-76
(1940). Historians generally agree that the central government was not powerful enough
because it lacked the authority to enforce even the limited powers it had been granted by
the Articles. See W. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM - STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 48 (1967). See also, A. Mc-
LAUGHLIN, THE FEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1962).
13. James Madison's opinion was that:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government,
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external ob-
jects, as war, peace, negociation, and foreign commerce.... The powers reserved
to the several states will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
The Virginia Plan, though introduced by Edmund Randolph, was primarily authored by
James Madison. It was this plan, calling for a system based on national supremacy, that
was the basis of the newly formed government. See MURPHY, supra note 12, at 145-48.
Other delegates, such as Robert Yates and Luther Martin, favored the New Jersey Plan,
which would have retained power in the states while only slightly increasing the power of
the national government. Id. at 146-47.
14. See La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmen-
tal Immunity and the. States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 789-95
(1982). See also Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 852 (1979) (so long as the values of political participation and lib-
erty, central to the design of the Constitution, are enforceable, the relative importance of
3
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Court has been asked over the past two centuries to interpret
the document's ambiguities on the question of whether it is the
state government or the national government that should reign
supreme on certain questions.1 5
2. Early Interpretations of the Commerce Clause by the
Supreme Court: 1824-1888
The commerce clause's was included in the Constitution to
bring about commercial reform.' 7 The first major case to inter-
pret the scope of the commerce clause was Gibbons v. Ogden,'5
in which Chief Justice Marshall set forth a sweeping opinion on
congressional power under the commerce clause. He stated that
"[tlhis power . . . is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
political and judicial protection of state autonomy will evolve with the needs of the na-
tion); Note, Separating Myth From Reality in Federalism Decisions: A Perspective of
American Federalism - Past and Present, 35 VAND. L. REv. 161, 170-71 (1982) (The
Founding Fathers were pragmatic men who declined to delineate a rigid allocation of
powers and functions between national and state governments. The political branches
should make most decisions on allocation of powers and functions in the federal
system.).
15. For a discussion of the shifting balance between the power reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment and the power granted to the federal government under the
commerce clause, see infra Part II of this Note.
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 states: "The Congress shall have power ... to regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
17. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244-50 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). "[T]he
rising volume of restraints upon commerce ... [was] the proximate cause of our national
existence down to today." Id. at 245. But see id. at 266 (Powell, J., dissenting) (although
removing trade barriers was one of the Constitution's purposes, the central purpose was
"to constitute a government"). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 137 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961):
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States contrary to the true
spirit of the Union, have in different instances given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others; and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not
restrained by a national controul, would be multiplied and extended till they be-
came not less serious sources of animosity and discord, than injurious impedi-
ments to the intercourse between the different parts of the confederacy.
Id.
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). New York had granted exclusive rights to Robert
Livingston and Robert Fulton to operate steamboats in New York waters each of whom
assigned his rights to Aaron Ogden. Ogden obtained an injunction from the New York
court ordering Thomas Gibbons, who was operating his boats under a federal license, to
stop navigating in New York waters. Id. at 2, 7.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/2
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prescribed in the constitution."19 This broad interpretation gave
Congress the power to regulate intrastate commerce, providing
such intrastate activity had some effect on the commercial af-
fairs of another state.20
In Brown v. Maryland,2 1 the Court invalidated a state stat-
ute imposing a tax on wholesale importers. Chief Justice Mar-
shall introduced the "original package" test which imposed a tax
on goods imported into the state in their original package.22 The
Court held that such a tax clearly violated article I, section 10,21
since states are constitutionally prohibited from laying such du-
ties on imports.2 The tax was also found to be unconstitutional
because of Congress' exclusive power under the commerce clause
to regulate the sale of imports.2 5
Following Brown v. Maryland, there were several decisions
during the Taney era in which the Court upheld state regulation
of commerce by broadly construing the "police power" of the
state2 6 The Court turned away from this approach in 1851 in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.2 7 In 1803, Pennsylvania had en-
acted a law which required ships entering or leaving the Port of
19. Id. at 196.
20. Id. at 197. Chief Justice Marshall declined to interpret the commerce clause to
extend to the purely internal commerce of a state: "The completely internal commerce of
a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself." Id. at 195.
21. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
22. Id. at 441-42.
23. Id. at 445. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 states: "No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports .. .
24. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 440-45.
25. Id. at 446-47. The only other case decided by the Marshall Court that consid-
ered the commerce clause and its relationship to state regulatory authority was Willson
v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). Delaware authorized the
company to build a dam in Black Bird Creek which flowed into the Delaware River.
Obstructing navigation on the river, the dam was damaged when the operators of a fed-
erally-licensed sloop attempted to pass through the creek. Allowing the company's suit
for damages, Chief Justice Marshall found no conflict between the Congress' power to
regulate commerce in its dormant state and state regulation authorizing construction of a
dam to improve the property values and the health of the local inhabitants. Id. at 246-
52.
26. See, e.g., New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (upholding under the
police power of the state, a New York statute that required every shipmaster who arrived
in New York from anywhere outside the state to make a report on each passenger). See
also The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (sustaining state licensing require-
ments for liquor brought in from outside the state).
27. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
5
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Philadelphia to employ a local pilot s and imposed a penalty for
failure to comply. The Court upheld this regulation, stating that
Congress' power to regulate commerce did not deprive the states
of all power to do so.29 The Court recognized that Congress had
the authority to legislate in areas where the matters were "in
their nature national." 0 However, the Court interpreted the Act
of August 7, 178931 to allow states to legislate in areas where
there were peculiarly local concerns, "until Congress shall find it
necessary to exert its power. ' s2
During the Reconstruction Era, the Court decided few com-
mercial cases.33 However, it was during this period that the
Court, for the first time, invalidated a federal statute on the
ground that it exceeded Congress' authority to regulate com-
merce.34 The Court soon resumed its trend toward broad inter-
pretation of the commerce clause power in The Daniel Ball.35
The Daniel Ball was a steamer which navigated the Grand River
and transported people and goods solely within the state of
Michigan.3 The steamer was fined five hundred dollars for not
complying with the federal government's licensing and inspec-
tion requirements.3 7 The Court upheld the regulation on the
grounds that a ship which participates in the interstate trans-
portation of merchandise is an "instrument of ... commerce"38
and "subject to the legislation of Congress. ' '1 9
In short, the Court's earliest commerce clause decisions
granted to Congress somewhat broad authority to regulate com-
merce, while at the same time limiting the states' ability to do
so.
28. Id. at 311-12.
29. Id. at 320.
30. Id. at 319.
31. Chapter 9, § 4, 1 Stat. 53, 54 (1789).
32. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
33. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 146 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
34. See United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870) (federal statute banning
certain sales of a petroleum product was struck down on the theory that it was a police
regulation relating exclusively to the internal trade of the state).
35. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
36. Id. at 565.
37. Id. at 558.
38. Id. at 565.
39. Id.
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3. The Commerce Power Strictly Construed: 1888-1937
During the years 1888-1937, in which economic regulation
became both prevalent and necessary,4 the Court sought to in-
still primarily conservative economic and social values into its
opinions.41 The tenth amendment42 became a popular device
with which to limit the reach of federal power over certain state
activities.43
One mode employed by the Court to limit the scope of fed-
eral regulatory power was to define "commerce" narrowly.44 In
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,4" the American Sugar Refin-
ing Company acquired the stock of four Philadelphia refineries,
thus gaining virtual control over the nation's sugar refining in-
dustry."' The government sought cancellation of the stock trans-
fer, alleging that it constituted an illegal combination in re-
straint of trade under the Sherman Act.' 7 The Court in finding
the Sherman Act inapplicable, distinguished manufacturing
from commerce, noting that "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufac-
ture, and is not a part of it."' "4 The Court further noted that
commerce "furnishes the strongest bond of union,"" while the
police power, which includes regulation of manufacturing, "is es-
sential to the preservation of the autonomy of the States." 50
40. See, e.g., The Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) and the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
41. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 136-74 (1960). See, e.g., Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) wherein the Court held a New York law unconstitu-
tional as violative of the fourteenth amendment. While disclaiming that they had al-
lowed their own views to affect their judgment, the Court stated that "[w]e do not be-
lieve in the soundness of the views which uphold this law." Id. at 61.
42. See supra note 1.
43. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 41, at 166.
44. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (state regulation prohibiting the
manufacture of intoxicating beverages for export to other states was upheld, since manu-
facturing was not subject to Congress' commerce power).
45. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. To emphasize just how sharply the Court drew the line between national and
state powers, the Court stated: "Slight reflection will show that if the national power
extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other
productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, compara-
tively little of business operations and affairs would be left for state control." Id. at 16.
7
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In Swift & Co. v. United States,5 1 however, the Court up-
held application of the Sherman Act to interstate packing-
houses. In Swift, the combination was held to constitute an ille-
gal restraint of trade even though it was located within a single
state.5 2 The Court distinguished the packinghouses from the
sugar refining monopoly in E.C. Knight on the ground that
Swift's "effect upon commerce among the States [was] not acci-
dental, secondary, remote or merely probable, 6 3 since Swift in-
volved the sale of goods, not the manufacture of them.54
In the years that followed, the Court upheld many regula-
tions as falling within the commerce power.55 The Court fol-
lowed the E.C. Knight approach in the area of employer-em-
ployee relations during this period." The Court specifically
applied the tenth amendment as a limitation on the federal
commerce power in Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor
Case).5 7 Congress sought to prohibit the interstate shipment of
products manufactured by companies which employed minors.58
In distinguishing child labor situations from instances where
Congress sought to regulate commerce as a means of attacking
an identified "evil,"59 the Court in Hammer viewed the goods
51. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
52. Id. at 396-97. Although the bidding that fixed the price of meat took place solely
within a single state, the Court found that it was but a step in the sales process. Id. at
397.
53. Id. Although this case has been cited as creating the "stream of commerce" the-
ory for the growth of the federal commerce power, commentators have noted that "the
opinion could be interpreted in a restrictive manner because the test required tangible
connections and direct relationships to commerce." NOWAK, supra note 33, at 153.
54. 196 U.S. at 397.
55. See, e.g., The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 354 (1903) (up-
holding the Federal Lottery Act which prohibited something the majority clearly viewed
as an "evil" - the interstate movement of lottery tickets). See also Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding the Pure Food and Drug Act which prohib-
ited the use of interstate commerce to transport adulterated articles); Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act which prohibited the transporta-
tion of women across state lines for the purpose of prostitution).
56. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a statute that prohibited railroads from firing
employees due to their membership in a union).
57. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
58. See Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916). A father of two minor
children brought an action on their behalf to enjoin enforcement of the Act. Hammer,
247 U.S. at 268.
59. See supra note 55.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/2
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manufactured by minors as being "themselves harmless."60 The
Court held that the federal statute was a police regulation which
unconstitutionally attempted to regulate internal affairs of a
state which were "carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth
Amendment."61 Justice Holmes, author of the majority opinion
in Swift, issued a strong dissent, stating that the statute was
clearly within Congress' commerce power,6" and did not interfere
with state prerogatives.6 ' Congress could use its commerce power
to carry out its views of public policy, Justice Holmes wrote,
"with a view to the benefit of the nation as a whole."' 64
The period immediately prior to 1937 was marked by the
Court's attempt to limit aggressive federal legislation aimed at
national economic reform.6 5 A major piece of federal legislation
aimed at this end was the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA). 6 The NIRA purported to remove obstructions to the
free flow of interstate and foreign commerce.6 7 The President
was authorized under the NIRA to approve and adopt "codes of
fair competition" for various trades and industries." In
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,6 9 a unanimous Court
held the NIRA to be unconstitutional. The Schechter Poultry
Corporation had been convicted of violating of the NIRA's Live
Poultry Code.7 0 The Court found that regulation of Schechter's
activities fell outside the commerce power,7 ' because their poul-
try was slaughtered and sold solely within the state of New
York, and thus was outside the "stream of commerce. ' 72 More-
60. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272.
61. Id. at 274.
62. Id. at 277-78 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 281. Since the states sought to send their products across state lines,
power over such commerce belongs to Congress. Id.
64. Id. But see The Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S.
20 (1922). Justice Holmes joined in that opinion invalidating a tax imposed on anyone
who employed child laborers. The Court viewed this tax as an attempt to circumvent its
previous ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart. Id. at 27.
65. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 41, 161-69.
66. Chapter 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
67. Id. at 195 § 1. See NowAK, supra note 33, at 157.
68. Chapter 90, § 3(a), 48 Stat. 195, 196-97 (1933).
69. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
70. Id. at 519.
71. Id. at 543.
72. Id.
19861
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over, the wages and hours under which their employees worked
did not have a "direct" effect on interstate commerce.73 The
Court viewed the regulation of these subjects as reserved to the
states. 4
As Schechter and other contemporaneous cases demon-
strate, immediately prior to 1937, the Court chose to interpret
Congress' commerce power narrowly. Claiming that the tenth
amendment was a direct limitation on federal commerce power,
the Court struck down major pieces of federal legislation.7 5
4. The Modern View of the Commerce Clause: 1937 to the
Present
Frustrated by the Schechter line of cases, President
Roosevelt proposed a plan after his first reelection to add up to
six new justices to the Supreme Court. Although Roosevelt's
proposal was purportedly to aid the problem of an overcrowded
docket,76 it has been suggested that this court-packing plan was
a mere pretext in order to justify appointment of justices sympa-
thetic to New Deal legislation." President Roosevelt's scheme
never received much support, but the Court's opinions changed,
reflecting the political pressure.7 8 Recognizing Congress' power
to legislate in areas affecting interstate commerce, the Court up-
held the National Labor Relations Act,79 the Social Security
73. Id. at 548.
74. Id. at 549-50.
75. In the year following the Schechter decision, the Court used the tenth amend-
ment to limit federal regulation in two other cases. In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936), the Court held the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 unconstitutional finding
that it "invades the reserved rights of the states." Id. at 68. The Court viewed the regula-
tion of agricultural production as not within any of the powers granted to the federal
government. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court invalidated the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 which set minimum wages and maximum
hours for coal miners. The Court viewed the production of coal as a purely local matter.
Id. at 303-04. It also viewed employer-employee relations as a purely local issue. Id. at
308. Justice Cardozo issued a dissenting opinion, stating that he would have upheld the
Act's price-setting provisions because of the direct impact that the price of intrastate
coal sales had on the price of interstate coal sales. Id. at 325 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
76. See R. McCLOSKEY, supra note 41, at 168-69.
77. See NOWAK, supra note 33, at 40.
78. Id. at 40-41.
79. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (The Act did not
exceed the commerce power.).
[Vol. 6:599
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Act, 0 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 1
In United States v. Darby,82 the Court upheld the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour protections of the FLSA.ss Deliv-
ering the opinion of a unanimous Court, Justice Stone took judi-
cial notice of the statute's legislative purposes: to promote labor
peace, to ensure minimum standards of living, to enhance the
spending power of workingmen, and to safeguard fair competi-
tion in interstate commerce by excluding goods manufactured by
workers paid a substandard wage. 84 The Court found that Con-
gress' power over interstate commerce was complete and could
be utilized to the full extent granted by the Constitution. 5
Moreover, "[t]he motive and purpose of a regulation of inter-
state commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon
the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and
over which the courts are given no control."8 6 Regarding the
tenth amendment, the Court held that it merely restated the ex-
isting relationship between the state and federal governments as
established by the Constitution prior to adoption of the tenth
amendment.8 7 Its purpose was "to allay fears that the new na-
tional government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their re-
served powers."88
80. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the old age benefits provi-
sion); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the unemployment
compensation tax and payment provisions).
81. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 125-26.
84. Id. at 109-10.
85. Id. at 114 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
86. Id. at 115.
87. Id. at 124.
88. Id. When James Madison proposed the tenth amendment at the first Congress,
he stated:
I find from looking into the amendments proposed by the State conventions that
several are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the Constitution that
the powers not therein delegated should be reserved to the several States. Perhaps
other words may define this more precisely than the whole of the instrument now
does. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm in mak-
ing such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I
understand it so, and do therefore propose it.
Brief for Appellant, Joe G. Garcia at 11, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (quoting History of Congress 441 (June 8, 1789)). See also
19861
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Following Darby, the Court has sustained virtually eyvery
federal regulation of a commercial subject,89 unless it lacked
some "rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators."90 Thus, the Court has upheld federal regulation of
even seemingly insignificant, strictly local commercial activity.9
B. Fair Labor Standards Act
In both National League of Cities v. Usery92 and Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,3 the constitu-
tionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 4 as applied
to state and municipal employees, was challenged. Congress en-
acted the FLSA in 1938 upon finding that, inter alia, the exis-
tence of substandard labor conditions "burden[ed] commerce
and the free flow of goods in commerce." 95 Pursuant to its com-
merce power,96 Congress established minimum wage97 and maxi-
W. CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
690-708 (1953) (discussing the wording of the tenth amendment).
89. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 41, at 184-87.
90. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
91. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the application of
quotas established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to a small farmer who
produced wheat primarily for his own consumption using the "chain of commerce" rea-
soning). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the applica-
tion of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a restaurant because the restaurant
purchased meat that had moved in interstate commerce).
92. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
93. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
95. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1982)). Congress found that the existence of sub-
standard labor conditions:
(1) cause[d] commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be
used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the
several States; (2) burden[ed] commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;
(3) constitute[d] an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) [led] to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in com-
merce; and (5) interfere[d] with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in
commerce.
Id.
96. The FLSA provided that:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this [Act], through the exercise by Con-
gress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States, to correct and
as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to in such in-
dustries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power.
Id., at § 2(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1982)).
97. "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/2
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mum hour 8 standards in order to eliminate the hardships im-
posed on the "ordinary workingman."" Because the FLSA was
enacted pursuant to Congress' commerce power, its scope was
necessarily limited to workers engaged in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to review the constitu-
tionality of the FLSA came in United States v. Darby.0e In up-
holding the FLSA, the Darby Court concurred in the congres-
sional findings embodied in the Act' and found the wage and
hour requirements to be "means reasonably adapted to the at-
tainment of the permitted end"'10 of eliminating substandard la-
bor conditions.
In the forty-five years since Darby, the FLSA has been peri-
odically amended, considerably broadening the class of workers
protected by the Act's provisions. Specifically excluded from the
original Act's definition of "employer" was "the United States or
any State or political subdivision of a State."'03 Also noteworthy,
in the context of National League of Cities and Garcia, was the
original Act's exemption of transit workers from FLSA wage and
hour provisions.'"s In 1961 the enterprise concept'0 5 was intro-
or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following rates - . . ." Id., at §
6(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1982)).
98. Id., at § 7(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1063 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)
(1982)) provided that overtime compensation be set at a "rate not less than one and one-
half times the regular rate."
99. See Wirtz v. Patelos Door Corp., 280 F. Supp. 212, 216 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (The
legislation was "lalimed primarily at protecting the ordinary workingman," exempting
from its coverage certain employees such as executives, professionals, administrative per-
sonnel, and outside salesmen.).
100. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In Darby, a lumber manufacturer was indicted for violat-
ing the FLSA. The district court quashed the indictment and held the FLSA unconstitu-
tional because it permitted federal regulation of a local manufacturing activity.
101. 312 U.S. at 102. "The congressional committees made specific findings which
were embodied in the Act .... These findings accord with facts of which this Court has
already taken judicial notice, and are conclusive." Id.
102. Id. at 121. The Court further held that the tenth amendment presented no
barrier to the FLSA. Id. at 123-24. "The amendment states but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered." Id. at 124.
103. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)).
104. "[The provisions of sections 206 and 207 shall not apply with respect to] any
employee of a street, suburban, or interurban electric railway, or local trolley or motor
bus carrier, not included in other exemptions contained in this section." Id. at § 13(a)(9),
52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938) (amended 1961).
105. "'Enterprise' means the related activities performed (either through unified
13
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duced to the FLSA. Under this concept workers engaged in
wholly intrastate activities were brought within the Act's cover-
age if their employer was an enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce."0 6 Thus, employees of privately owned mass transit
systems were brought within the FLSA's coverage1 0 7 since the
1961 Act treated mass transit systems as enterprises engaged in
commerce. 08 Public mass transit systems were unaffected by the
1961 FLSA amendments because state and municipal agencies
remained specifically excluded from the Act's definition of em-
ployers.109 The FLSA was further amended in 1966 to extend
coverage to state and municipal workers employed by schools,
hospitals and mass transit systems,110 thus marking the first ap-
plication of the FLSA to public sector employees.
The extension of the FLSA to cover state hospital and
operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose
.... .Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(c), 75 Stat. 65,
65 (1961) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982)).
106. See Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 855 (1973) (Janitors and maids in an office building were covered by the Act
because even though they engaged in solely intrastate activites, elevator operators, who
handled interstate shipments of mail and goods, brought all the building's employees
within the Act's coverage.). See also L. WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 8-9
(1977).
107. "[The provisions of sections 206 and 207 shall not apply with respect to] any
employee of a street, suburban, or interurban electric railway, or local trolley or motor
bus carrier, not in an enterprise described in section [2013(s)(2)." Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9, 75 Stat. 65, 72 (1961) (repealed 1966).
108. "'Enterprise engaged in commerce' . . . [includes] ... any such enterprise
which is engaged in the business of operating a street, suburban or interurban electric
railway, or local trolley or motor bus carrier if the annual gross volume of sales of such
enterprise is not less than $1,000,000." Id. at § 2(c), 75 Stat. 65, 66 (1961) (amended
1966).
109. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. The following caveat was introduced into the exemption of state and local em-
ployers: "[E]xcept with respect to employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof,
employed (1) in a hospital, institution, or school referred to in the last sentence of sub-
section (r) of this section, or (2) in the operation of a railway or carrier referred to in
such sentence." Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, §
102(b), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (1966) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)). The last
sentence of subsection (r) provided that the operation of hospitals, schools, and mass
transit systems (public or private) "shall be deemed to be activities performed for a busi-
ness purpose." Id., at § 102(a), 80 Stat. 830, 831 (1966) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
203(r) (1982)). Section 13(a)(9) of the FLSA was repealed. Id. at § 206(a), 80 Stat. 830,
836 (1966).
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school employees through use of the enterprise concept was
promptly challenged in Maryland v. Wirtz."' The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the enterprise concept as a means of ex-
tending FLSA coverage to public sector employees. The Court
expounded two theories supporting the constitutionality of the
enterprise concept. 12 Under the "competition" theory, the
Court found that enterprises which employed workers engaged
in wholly intrastate tasks at a substandard wage unfairly re-
duced operating costs and thereby enjoyed a competitive advan-
tage over more scrupulous employers. 11 3 Under the "labor dis-
pute" theory, the Court found that when substandard conditions
caused workers engaged in wholly intrastate tasks to strike, the
resulting disruption of an enterprise's operations had an effect
upon interstate commerce.1 14 Moreover, because the operation of
schools and hospitals had an undoubted impact upon interstate
commerce,115 use of the commerce power to provide coverage to
state employees engaged in these enterprises was constitu-
tional.1 6 The 1974 amendments to the FLSA extended mini-
mum wage and maximum hour protection to virtually all state
and municipal employees.' 1 7 This broadened FLSA coverage was
111. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
112. Id. at 192.
113. Id. at 189-91.
114. Id. at 191-92.
115. Id. at 194. Maryland schools made 87% of their purchases out-of-state and the
state hospitals made 55% of their purchases out-of-state. Id. (quoting Maryland v.
Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 833 (D. Md. 1967)).
116. 392 U.S. at 195. The Court held that its decision in United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936) was "controlling." Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198. In United States v. Cali-
fornia, the Court unanimously held that application of federal safety standards to a
state-owned railroad was constitutional. 297 U.S. at 185. In considering application of a
commerce regulation to a state agency, the Court held: "The state can no more deny the
power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual." Id. quoted
in Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198.
Justice Douglas wrote a vigorous dissent in Wirtz which was joined by Justice Stew-
art. Wirtz v. Maryland, 392 U.S. at 201-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Distinguishing
United States v. California, Justice Douglas found that the safety regulation involved in
that case did not "overwhelm state fiscal policy." Id. at 203-04. The dissent was alarmed
by the possibility of the commerce clause being used to "devour the essentials of state
sovereignty" which the tenth amendment was designed to protect. Id. at 205.
117. Under the 1974 FLSA amendments, governmental agencies were no longer ex-
cluded from the "employer" definition. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 58 (1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)
(1982)). Only limited exceptions from wage and hour protection were made for such state
1986]
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challenged in National League of Cities."'8
C. National League of Cities
In National League of Cities v. Usery,119 the Supreme
Court considered, for the first time, the constitutionality of the
1974 amendments to the FLSA.12 0 These amendments elimi-
"employees" as elected and appointed officials. Id. at § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 59 (1974)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
118. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
In the term immediately preceeding National League of Cities, the Court decided
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). Fry involved a tenth amendment challenge to
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) which
granted the President sweeping authority to control wages. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. I
1970). Ohio state employees secured a writ of mandamus in state court directing pay-
ment of a wage increase in excess of that permitted under the Economic Stabilization
Act. The United States sought an injunction in federal district court blocking payment
of the increase. The question was certified to the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals which upheld the Act and enjoined payment of the wage increase. United States v.
Ohio, 487 F.2d 936 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973). The Supreme Court affirmed. The
Court held that its decision in Wirtz "foreclosed" any argument that commerce regula-
tions were inapplicable to the states. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 548. Although the
Court allowed the Act to stand, it did provide recognition to the tenth amendment, ob-
serving that although it was a "'truism' ... it [was] not without significance." Id. at 547
n.7. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the erosion of state sovereignty evinced
by the Court's opinion and was likewise critical of Wirtz and United States v. California.
Id. at 549-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Justice Rehnquist's view, the United States
v. California Court gave "short shrift" to the states' rights argument because it has so
often been asserted as a ius tertii. Id. at 551 ("The claim of 'States rights' had so fre-
quently been invoked in the past as a form of ius tertii, not by a State but by a business
enterprise seeking to avoid congressional regulation, that the different tenor of the claim
made by the State of California may not have impressed the Court."). Justice Rehnquist
argued that a state's tenth amendment challenge to a commerce regulation should be
treated no differently than an individual's challenge to such a regulation under the first
or fifth amendment. Id. at 553. Looking to the analogous area of intergovernmental tax
immunity, Justice Rehnquist cited Chief Justice Stone for the proposition that a federal
tax, nondiscriminatory upon its face, may nevertheless be unconstitutional as applied to
a state. Id. at 555-57 (citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586-87 (1946)
(Stone, C.J., concurring)). In short, Justice Rehnquist urged that "traditional govern-
mental activities" such as those involved in Wirtz were "beyond Congress' commerce
authority" and advocated "case-by-case" refinement in "gray areas." Id. at 557-58.
119. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
120. Appellants included individual cities and states, the National League of Cities,
and the National Governors' Conference. Id. at 836. Challenging the 1974 amendments
in the federal district court for the District of Columbia, appellants sought both declara-
tory and injunctive relief. Id. at 839. Because the constitutionality of a federal statute
was at issue, the case was heard by a panel of three district court judges pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2282 (repealed in 1976). The Secretary of Labor's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was sustained. Na-
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nated substantially all of the wage and hour exemptions for-
merly enjoyed by public agencies. 2 ' The Court held that "inso-
far as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, they are not within the au-
thority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3V''122 The majority
opinion " did not define "traditional governmental functions,"
but offered "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation" as illustrative examples. 24 In
reaching its decision the Court expressly overruled Maryland v.
Wirtz12 5 but reaffirmed United States v. California126 and Fry v.
tional League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827 (D.D.C. 1974). The three-judge
panel dismissed the complaint with reluctance, however, and wrote that appellant's argu-
ments were: "substantial and that it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it
appropriate to draw back from the far-reaching implications of Wirtz ...." Id. at 828.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982), appellants appealed the district court ruling di-
rectly to the Supreme Court.
121. " 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency. Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 58 (1974)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)) (emphasis added).
122. 426 U.S. at 852. The Court deferred judgment on whether such amendments
would have been upheld pursuant to Congress' spending power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1, or § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at n.17.
123. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell joined in
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court. Justice Blackmun, in addition to joining the
Court's opinion, filed a separate concurrence. Justices White and Marshall joined the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent.
124. 426 U.S. at 851. Because the Court made no significant effort to define a tradi-
tional governmental function, it can be implied that the majority would rely upon the
case-by-case analysis suggested in Justice Rehnquist's Fry dissent. See supra note 118.
125. 426 U.S. at 852-55. See also text accompanying note 124 (the operation of
schools and hospitals was analogous to the exempted functions set forth by the Court,
therefore Wirtz was overruled). The Court held:
While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in
Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral
portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdi-
visions have traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that
Wirtz must be overruled.
Id. at 855.
126. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. The Court was critical of
"dicta" in United States v. California that equated a state's commerce clause standing
with that of an individual. Id. at 854-55. Nevertheless, the Court held that operation of a
railroad engaged in interstate commerce was not a traditional governmental function. Id.
at 854 n.18.
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United States.127
The National League of Cities decision did not abridge
Congress' power to "pre-empt express state-law determinations"
addressed to "wholly private activit[ies].' 12  However, because
the 1974 FLSA amendments were directed at the states as em-
ployers, the Court reasoned that the tenth amendment acted as
an "affirmative limitation" upon the commerce power. 2 " Deter-
mining the wages and hours of employees engaged in "govern-
mental functions"' 30 was held to be an "undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.'' The Court reviewed the hardships imposed
upon the states by compliance with the amendments but de-
clined to rest its holding upon such economic impact.132 Rather,
127. Id. at 852-53. The majority distinguished Fry by finding that the Economic
Stabilization Act addressed a national emergency with which only federal action could
effectively deal; the Act displaced no important state functions; and the Act "reduc[ed]
the pressures upon state budgets rather than increas[ing] them." Id. at 853.
128. Id. at 840.
Congress may regulate the intrastate activities of similarly situated parties when the
accumulated effect of such parties' activities has an impact upon interstate commerce.
Id. (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
Congress may exercise its commerce power by any means "reasonably adapted to
[an] end permitted by the Constitution." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 840
(quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964)).
129. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841-43. The Court noted that Bill of
Rights protections were capable of limiting exercises of the commerce power. Id. at 841
(citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (provision of the Federal Kidnap-
ping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), allowing death penalty only in case of jury trial violates
fifth and sixth amendments)); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (disclosures re-
quired by the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1954) (repealed 1970), violate fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination)).
130. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. Because the Court's opinion does
not reach all state activities, a distinction similar to those drawn in the tax immunity
cases is made. "This distinction apparently revives what had been believed to be a thor-
oughly discredited dichotomy between governmental and proprietary activities of state
and local governments." NOWAK, supra note 33, at 173. See also Tribe, Unravelling Na-
tional League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Gov-
ernment Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1075 (1977) (This distinction "makes no real
sense when considered purely in terms of the state's interest 'qua State'....").
131. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, See also NOWAK, supra note 33, at
173 ("Unfortunately, the majority failed to specify exactly what aspects of the employer-
employee relationship made discretionary authority in this area an attribute of
sovereignty.").
132. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-51. Arizona estimated the cost of
compliance as $2.5 million; California estimated that compliance would cost between $8
and $16 million. Id. at 846. The Court acknowledged, however, that federal action which
pressured state budgets posed the risk that basic public services would go unprovided.
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the Court found that the determination of wages and hours of
governmental workers was a function of state sovereignty which
could not be abridged by Congress' commerce power.1 33 In short,
the states would have no role in the federal system if Congress
was permitted to pass legislation which left the states intact but
functionally irrelevant.13 4 Justice Blackmun provided the pivotal
fifth vote for the majority. In his separate concurrence, Justice
Blackmun interpreted the Court's decision as essentially a bal-
ancing test;'3 5 when the federal interest involved was "demon-
strably greater" than that of the states, regulation pursuant to
the commerce clause was constitutional. 136 However, a federal
regulation that deprived the states of their essential sovereignty,
such as the FLSA, could not pass constitutional muster. 137
National League of Cities provoked considerable crit-
ical comment' 8 and proved difficult to apply in the lower
Id. at 847. See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of "Sov-
ereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) (an analysis
which investigates this aspect of the case). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 312-13 (1978).
133. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
134. L. TRIBE, supra note 132, at 310.
135. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Although Justice Blackmun expressed some reservations about joining the
Court's opinion, he found that "the result with respect to the statute under challenge
here is necessarily correct." Id.
In dissent, Justice Brennan urged upholding the 1974 FLSA amendments by reas-
serting the principles of Fry and United States v. California. Id. at 856-80 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He argued for adherence to the long-settled principle that the only limit
upon the commerce power was that imposed by the political process. Id. at 857 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)). Justice
Brennan found no state sovereignty restraint upon exercise of the commerce power
which would be the equivalent of the individual protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 858. Calling for judicial restraint, Justice Brennan maintained that the
federal government's structure enabled the states to protect their interests. Id. at 876-
77.
Justice Stevens, in his separate dissent, concluded that the states had no "inherent
right to pay a substandard wage." Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Like Justice Bren-
nan, Justice Stevens maintained that the states should seek redress through the political
process. Id. at 881.
138. See, e.g., Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery - The Commerce Power
and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115 (1978) (The standard pro-
posed by the Court is unworkable and its reliance upon the concept of state sovereignty
is particularly ill-advised.); Tribe, supra note 130 (No rationale based on state autonomy
is possible which could both support the case's holding and sustain the distinctions
19
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courts.1 39 In an effort to provide better guidance, the Court in
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,""
reduced the holding of National League of Cities to a three-part
test.141 In order to invalidate legislation under National League
of Cities, each of the following requirements had to be met: (1)
the challenged statute had to regulate the "States as States"; 2
(2) the regulation had to address an indisputable attribute of
state sovereignty; 143 and (3) compliance had to directly impair a
State's ability to perform a traditional governmental function.
144
drawn by the Court.); Comment, Constitutional Law - Commerce Power Limited to Pre-
serve States' Role in the Federal System, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 152 (1976) (The Court's
test for commerce clause immunity is unworkable and based upon an inappropriate anal-
ogy to the tax immunity cases); Comment, At Federalism's Crossroads: National League
of Cities v. Usery, 57 B.U.L. REV. 178, 197 (1977) ("National League of Cities presents
the unique situation of a decision that is historically and theoretically justified but inca-
pable of principled application.").
139. See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979)
(operation of a municipal airport was a traditional governmental function); Molina-Es-
trada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845-46 (1st Cir. 1982) (operation of a
highway authority was a traditional governmental function); Williams v. Eastside Mental
Health Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671, 680-81 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982)
(operation of a mental health facility was not a traditional governmental function); Bon-
nette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983) (the
provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped was not a tradi-
tional governmental function). See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005, 1011 (1985) (analyzing these and other cases).
140. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). At issue in Hodel was the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (1977). Under the Act, the
states' authority to regulate surface mining operations was pre-empted unless a state
program meeting the federal standard was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
at 271-72. The Association unsuccessfully challenged the Act which was held not to of-
fend the standards of National League of Cities. See infra note 142.
141. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88.
142. Id. at 287. It was this first prong which was dispositive in Hodel. The Act gov-
erned "only the activities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and busi-
nesses." Id. at 288. Because such private individuals and businesses are "necessarily sub-
ject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and the State in which they
reside" the rule of National League of Cities was not offended. Id. at 293 (quoting Na-
tional League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845). The Act, directed at private operators, did not
affect the "States as States."
143. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 287-88.
144. Id. at 288. National League of Cities implicitly rejected any definitional quali-
fication of a "traditional governmental function" in favor of case-by-case development.
See supra note 124. However, the Sixth Circuit developed such a definitional approach
in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979). Under Amer-
sbach, an immune governmental function was one which: (1) "benefit[ed] the community
as a whole ... at little or no direct expense"; (2) "[was] undertaken for ... public service
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Moreover, an element of balancing was introduced into the Ho-
del formulation by the Court's recognition that in some cases
"the nature of the federal interest advanced may ... justif[y]
state submission" regardless of the outcome achieved through
applying the three-prong test. 4'
In United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail-
road,'46 the Court had occasion to apply this three-prong test. At
issue in Long Island Railroad was the applicability of the Rail-
way Labor Act to state railroad workers; 47 the third prong of
the Hodel test proved dispositive.146 The Court held that the op-
eration of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce was not a
traditional governmental function. 49 The Court found that the
railroad was only recently converted from private to public own-
ership,150 that the federal government had a long history of regu-
lating railroads,15' and that there was no comparable history of
rather than for pecuniary gain"; (3) was a service provided principally by the govern-
ment; and (4) was a service the government is uniquely suited to perform. Id. The Amer-
sbach court applied the above test to hold that the employees of a municipally operated
airport were performing a traditional governmental function. Id. at 1037-38. But see
Comment, National League of Cities Crashes on Takeoff: Balancing Under the Com-
merce Clause, 68 GEO. L.J. 827, 849 (1980) ("The road taken in Amersbach threatens sub
silentio to extend National League of Cities far beyond its rationale and could lead to
an unwarranted erosion of Congress' power to legislate under the commerce power.").
The Amersbach court gave particular emphasis to the third factor in its test, noting that
473 of 475 airports serving the United States were operated by government agencies.
Amersbach, 598 F.2d at 1038 n.7.
Regardless of whether a definitional or case-by-case approach is utilized, the finding
of a traditional governmental function does not end the inquiry under the third prong of
Hodel. The direct impairment feature of this prong was dispositive of the issue in EEOC
v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). At issue in EEOC was application of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), to a state
game warden. The management of state parks was held to be a traditional state function
but the level of federal intrusion was too insignificant to "directly impair" this state
operation. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 238-39.
145. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)
and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
146. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
147. Id. at 680.
148. Id. at 684. If the operation of the railroad was held to be a traditional govern-
mental function, New York's Taylor Law, barring strikes by public employees, and not
the Railway Labor Act, would apply to the railroad workers. Id. at 681-82.
149. Id. at 685.
150. Id. at 680. The Long Island Railroad was acquired by New York State in 1966
after 132 years of private ownership. Id.
151. Id. at 687-88. The Railway Labor Act, passed in 1926, is a manifestation of the
21
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state regulation of railroads. 52 However, the Court warned
against interpreting its emphasis upon tradition as "impos[ing] a
static historical view of state functions generally immune from
federal regulation."''5 3 Long Island Railroad was decisive in re-
moving state-operated railroads from the class of gray areas re-
quiring case-by-case development. A narrow reading of the
Court's holding, however, left its impact upon other modes of
public mass transit uncertain. Due to the uncertainty over its
proper scope, Long Island Railroad has an important place in
the procedural history of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.
D. Intergovernmental Immunity: The Federal Tax Cases
The majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority54 overruled National League of Cities v.
Usery' 55 because it was "inconsistent with established principles
of federalism, '"15 and because of the problems inherent in apply-
ing the holding of that opinion.157 National League of Cities
held that Congress did not have the authority to apply the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA to state
workers performing "traditional governmental functions."' 58 Fol-
lowing that decision, however, courts had difficulty identifying
which state functions were "traditional" and therefore immune
from federal regulation. 59 The Court in Garcia observed that
this difficulty was akin to that involved in the area of state im-
munity from federal taxation.6 0
The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity originated in
McCulloch v. Maryland.'" The Court held that a state tax lev-
ied upon a United States bank was unconstitutional on the
federal interest in railroad regulation that dates back to passage of the Interstate Com-
merce Act in 1887. Id.
152. Id. at 688.
153. Id. at 686.
154. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
155. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
156. 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
157. Id.
158. 426 U.S. at 852.
159. 105 S. Ct. at 1011. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
160. 105 S. Ct. at 1012-14.
161. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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ground that it could interfere with Congress' broad authority
under the necessary and proper clause. 6 2 Similarly, the Court in
Collector v. Day' held that Congress had no authority under
the Constitution to impose a tax upon a state judge.1 64 The
Court limited immunity from federal taxation to the "ordinary"
and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state govern-
ments in South Carolina v. United States.65 There the Court
upheld federal taxation of liquor sold in state-owned liquor
stores, refusing to extend the immunity to state instrumentali-
ties of a proprietary or private nature.16 6
In the years following South Carolina, the Court evinced
contradictory opinions regarding what constituted "governmen-
tal" functions as opposed to "proprietary" functions.6 7 In New
York v. United States,18 the Court abandoned any attempt to
make the distinction.' Writing for the Court, Justice Frank-
furter found that the distinction was "too shifting a basis for
determining constitutional power and too entangled in expedi-
ency to serve as a dependable legal criterion."' 70
Thus, like the Garcia Court reviewing the National League
162. Id. at 436.
163. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
164. Id. at 128. The Court also noted that the converse was true, pursuant to Dob-
bins v. Commissioners, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), namely, that the states had no au-
thority under the Constitution to impose a tax upon a federal employee. Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 124.
165. 199 U.S. 437, 451, 461 (1905).
166. Id. at 463. Thus, the Court held that the federal license tax on liquor dealers
was permissible, even though the dealers here were agents of the state. Id.
167. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), the Court upheld the imposi-
tion of a federal corporate tax on a municipal water supply on the ground that it was not
an essential state function. Id. at 172. Then, in Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352
(1937), the Court, without expressly overruling Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., held that the
acquisition and distribution of a municipal water supply was an essential governmental
function. Id. at 370. (emphasis added).
168. 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (upholding the federal taxation of state sales of mineral
waters from springs owned and operated by the state).
169. Id. at 583-84. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Frankfurter who
was joined only by Justice Rutledge. All eight justices who took part in the case, how-
ever, stated that the distinction was an untenable one. See id. at 586 (Stone, C.J., con-
curring, joined by Reed, Murphy and Burton, J.J.) and id. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting,
joined by Black, J.).
170. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. at 580. Justice Frankfurter would have
left it up to Congress to decide which of the activities of the states should be taxed. Id.
at 582.
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of Cities traditional governmental functions test,"', the Court in
New York v. United States was unable to fashion a workable
exegesis to determine which functions were entitled to immunity
from federal taxation.
III. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority:
Facts and Procedural History
Following the decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery,172 the Secretary of Labor promulgated regulations1 73 au-
thorizing the Wage and Hour Administrator of the Department
of Labor17 4 to determine which operations were subject to
FLSA's provisions. The Wage and Hour Administrator held1 75
that operations such as those of the San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority (SAMTA) were not traditional state func-
tions.17 6 SAMTA filed suit, seeking declaratory relief from the
FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions. The Secretary
of Labor counterclaimed against SAMTA for enforcement of the
overtime1 7 7 and record-keeping provisions 7 8 of the FLSA. At the
same time, Joe G. Garcia, on behalf of the operators of SAMTA,
instituted an action in federal district court against SAMTA
seeking unpaid overtime pay and liquidated damages. 17 That
suit was stayed pending disposition of the constitutional chal-
lenge instituted by SAMTA.' 80 Subsequently, Garcia was
granted leave to intervene as a defendant in the suit. 81 The Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas held that the rule
established by the United States Supreme Court in National
171. See supra notes 124, 144 and accompanying text.
172. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 775.2(b) (1985).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 775.0 (1985) authorizes this department to administer the Act.
175. See G. GINSBURG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL LABOR STANDARDS (2d ed.
1976). "The Administrator . . issues Interpretative Bulletins on provisions of the Act
and gives rulings in response to questions." Id. at 100.
176. 29 C.F.R. § 775.3(b) (1984).
177. § 7, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
178. § 11(c), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
179. § 16(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides for
liquidated damages in cases where an employer violates § 206 or § 207 of the FLSA.
180. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1009
(1985).
181. Id.
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League of Cities barred application of the FLSA's minimum
wage and overtime provisions to local public mass transit sys-
tems.1 82 The court held that the "Final Interpretation" of the
Wage and Hour Administrator was "null and void insofar as it
lists local public mass transit systems as not being integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions under Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery.''
Both Garcia and the Secretary of Labor sought a direct ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court. 8" On June 7, 1982,
the Court entered an order185 vacating the judgment of the dis-
trict court and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
their decision in United Transportation Union v. Long Island
Railroad.8"
On remand, the district court reaffirmed its original decision
and summary judgment was entered in favor of SAMTA. 87 The
court stated that the issue was whether operation of a local
transit authority by SAMTA, "a political subdivision of the
State of Texas, is a 'traditional' governmental function entitled
to the Tenth Amendment immunity recognized in National
League of Cities v. Usery."'88 The court then examined three
factors from Long Island Railroad. Examining the relevant "his-
torical reality," the court found that a long record of state activ-
ity indicated that a function was essential and one in which
"states have the primary responsibility for performing."' 89 The
court observed that overseeing, maintaining, and regulating local
and regional transportation systems "historically has been a
state responsibility."' 9 The court further reasoned that even
182. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 25 Wage & Hour Cas.
(BNA) 274 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
183. Id.
184. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982). These were direct appeals to the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). That section authorizes parties to take a direct appeal to
the United States Supreme Court when a district court finds the application of a federal
law to be unconstitutional and the United States or any of its agencies is a party to the
action.
185. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
186. 455 U.S. 678 (1982). For a discussion regarding the Long Island Railroad case,
see supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
187. 557 F. Supp. 445, 446 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
188. Id. (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 447.
190. Id.
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though the state had acquired the mass transit system only re-
cently, it had nonetheless "chose[n] to manifest [its] interest
through regulation of fares, routes, schedules, franchising, and
safety."''
Second, the court distinguished this case from Long Island
Railroad on the basis that, unlike the time-honored regulatory
scheme in Long Island Railroad where federal railway labor re-
lations statutes date back to 1888, the FLSA was only recently
amended 192 to include public transit employers.1 93
Third, the court identified factors jeopardizing the state's
separate and independent existence. 19 With guidance from Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry v. United States,"95 the district
court sought to analogize public transportation to other essential
state functions such as fire prevention, police protection, sanita-
tion, public health, and parks and recreation - traditional
state functions enumerated in National League of Cities.'
Finally, the district court examined the four-part test set
forth in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland's7 to determine whether
191. Id. at 448. The court cited a 1913 state statute that delegated to cities exclusive
control over their streets and highways, including regulation of carriages for hire. Id. at
n.1.
192. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067
(1938); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 9, 75 Stat 65, 72
(1961); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 206(a), 80 Stat.
830, 836 (1966).
193. 557 F. Supp. at 449. For further discussion of the applicability of the FLSA, see
supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
194. 557 F. Supp. at 450-54.
195. 421 U.S. 542, 558 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
196. 557 F. Supp. at 450-51. In order to support its reasoning, the court cited state-
ments of Representatives Addonizio and Corbett and Senators Biden and Hart that
noted the public necessity for mass transit. The court went on to distinguish Kramer v.
New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146
(1983) which appeared to be factually indistinguishable. The Kramer court had held that
the FLSA applied to bus operators employed by a public transit authority. The court
found that the test used by the Kramer court was unsatisfactory; they said Kramer dis-
tinguished public transit based on the large amounts of federal funding. The court found
that the level of federal funding was an unsatisfactory distinction as federal funding
supports each of the "Usery functions" and since federal funding levels tend to shift,
"reveal[ing] what the federal government considers its interest to be at any one point in
time, but they do not adequately measure a state's sovereign interest." San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. at 452.
197. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) (The operation of a municipally owned airport is
an integral governmental function within the meaning of National League of Cities.
Thus, airport employees are not subject to the minimum wage and maximum hour provi-
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a state activity constituted a traditional government function.
Amersbach held that a traditional governmental function was
one which: (1) benefited the whole community and was available
at little or no expense; (2) was a public service without pecuni-
ary gain; (3) was a function the government was particularly
well-suited to provide; and (4) was one in which government was
the principal provider. 98 The district court held that SAMTA
satisfied the Amersbach test, and found that public transit bene-
fits the community as a whole, by helping to eliminate air pollu-
tion, alleviate traffic congestion, conserve energy, and stimulate
economic development while providing services at a subsidized
price.1 99 The court also noted that the reality of transit econom-
ics is that such services cannot be operated at a profit.2 °0 There-
fore, government provides these services as a public service.01
Additionally, without the profit motive to attract private enter-
prise, the "government is the only component of society that can
provide the service. 2 02 Finally, government is the primary pro-
vider of transit services today.203
The district court concluded that FLSA wage and overtime
protections should not be imposed on SAMTA because it would
"undermine the states' role as surely as would the imposition of
the same provisions on state employees performing police, fire,
sanitation, health and recreational services. ''2 "
IV. Garcia: The Supreme Court Opinion
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity,20 5 the Supreme Court reconsidered the tenth amendment
principles set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery. 06 In a
five-to-four decision, the Court held the traditional governmen-
sions of the FLSA.). See Comment, supra note 144.
198. 557 F. Supp. at 453 (citing Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d at 1037).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 453-54 (citing Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 667 F.2d at 309
as asserting that by 1978 public transit accounted for 91% of total vehicle miles, 91% of
linked passenger trips, 90% of revenues generated and 87% of transit vehicles operated).
204. Id. at 454.
205. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
206. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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tal function standard to be unworkable and expressly overruled
National League of Cities.207
The majority opinion began with a description of SAMTA
operations2' 8 and a review of the case's procedural history.0 9 At
the outset of its analysis the Court stated that any immunity
enjoyed by SAMTA must be based upon its status as a public
agency because Congress' commerce power was clearly broad
enough to regulate the activities of a private enterprise engaged
in such activities.21 0 The Court restated the test for intergovern-
mental immunity developed in National League of Cities and
summarized in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Association" focusing upon the "traditional governmental
function" strand as the most troublesome aspect of that test.21
The Court reviewed the efforts of lower courts to distinguish im-
mune from non-immune functions21 3 and found that no "or-
ganizing principle" existed.21 4 Moreover, the Court found that
its own opinions were of little use in defining the scope of im-
mune functions.2 15 The Court next analogized its commerce
207. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007. Justice Blackmun, whose concurrence provided the
pivotal fifth vote in National League of Cities, was the author of the Court's Garcia
opinion. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
208. 105 S. Ct. at 1007-08. In 1959, the city purchased the privately owned San
Antonio Transit Company which became known as the San Antonio Transit System. In
1978, the transit system's facilities and equipment were transferred to the county run
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA). SAMTA and its predecessor re-
ceived significant federal grants principally by means of the Urban Mass Transit Act of
1964. Id.
209. Id. at 1008-10. See supra Part III of this Note.
210. 105 S. Ct. at 1010. "Any constitutional exemption from the requirements of the
FLSA ... must rest on SAMTA's status as a governmental entity rather than on the
'local' nature of its operations." Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941)).
211. Id. at 1010-11. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
212. "Despite the abundance of adjectives, identifying which particular state func-
tions are immune remains difficult." Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011 (quoting San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 447 (W.D. Tex. 1983)).
213. Id. at 1011. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
214. 105 S. Ct. at 1011. "The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers
[immune function] and regulating traffic, [non-immune function] ... or between operat-
ing a highway authority [immune function] and operating a mental health facility, [non-
immune function] is elusive at best." Id.
215. Id. (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854 and n.18). National
League of Cities set forth illustrative examples without explaining how those examples
were selected. See also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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clause immunity test to the now defunct governmental-proprie-
tary test as it formerly existed in the field of intergovernmental
tax immunity.216 The Court interpreted the forty-year history of
the intergovernmental tax immunity cases as militating against
continued case-by-case development of the "traditional govern-
mental function" test in commerce clause immunity cases.21 7
History,21 8 uniqueness,21 9 and necessity2 0 were likewise rejected
as unsuitable standards for classifying immune functions. In
short, the Court would not adopt any standard that required the
judiciary to make policy decisions which the Court viewed as
legislative in nature.22
The Garcia Court adopted the position of the National
League of Cities dissenters2 2 in finding that the principle limi-
tation upon exercise of the commerce power is that imposed by
the states' participation in the federal system. 223 The Court ar-
gued that any test of commerce clause immunity based upon
concepts of state sovereignty was flawed because the Constitu-
tion withdrew a wide range of sovereign powers from the
216. 105 S. Ct. at 1012-14. See supra text accompanying notes 154-70.
217. 105 S. Ct. at 1012-14. In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905),
the Court held that only the governmental activities of a state were immune from federal
taxation. After 40 years of struggling with the governmental-proprietary distinction, the
Court abandoned this test as untenable in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946). See supra text accompanying notes 154-70.
218. A purely historical standard for judging immune functions was rejected in
United Transport. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982). See supra text ac-
companying note 153. Use of a historical standard would not accommodate the states'
desire to provide innovative services, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1014 and n.9, and the rela-
tively "recent vintage" of most federal regulations, dating from the New Deal era, has no
bearing upon the strength of the federal interest. Id. at 1014 and n.10.
219. "Uniqueness" was rejected by the Court as a standard in the field of govern-
mental tort liability after it had proved to be unworkable. Id. at 1015 (citing Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955)) ("[Ilt is hard to think of any gov-
ernmental activity on the 'operational level' . . . which is 'uniquely governmental,' in the
sense that its kind has not at one time or another been, or could not conceivably be,
privately performed.").
220. Necessity is an unworkable standard to judge immune functions because al-
most any governmental function could be provided by a private agency operating under
contract. 105 S. Ct. at 1015.
221. Id. "Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or
,necessary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judi-
ciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."
Id.
222. See supra note 137.
223. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
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states.224 The states retained their sovereign authority "only to
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their
original powers."225 The Court supported its proposition, that
the federal system was designed to protect the states' inter-
ests, 226 by citing the legislative history of the Constitution and
contemporaneous writings of the Framers.227 Because National
League of Cities "underestimated ... the continued vitality" 228
of these procedural safeguards, it was overruled and the political
process was recognized as the "principal ' 2 9 limitation upon ex-
ercise of the commerce power.
In dissent, Justice Powell was critical of the majority for ig-
noring the principle of stare decisis in overruling National
League of Cities.2 30 Justice Powell observed that the rationale of
National League of Cities had been repeatedly reaffirmed by the
224. Id. at 1017.
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the
States is to say little about the nature of the role .... With rare exceptions, like
the guarantee, in Article IV, § 3, of state territorial integrity, the Constitution
does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not
employ its delegated powers to displace.
Id.
225. Id. The states have an "indirect" influence over the House of Representatives
and the President, as well as a "more direct" influence over the Senate where the equal
representation of the states is assured. Id. at 1018 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. II, §
1; art. I, § 3; art. V). "State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. "[T]he Federal Government 'will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the
States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives
of their governments.'" Id. at 1018 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 332 (J. Madison)
(B. Wright ed. 1961)). "[Tlhe residuary sovereignty of the States [is] implied and se-
cured by ... representation in one branch of the [federal] legislature (emphasis added)."
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 315 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
228. Id. at 1021. The Court found evidence of the continued vitality of these proce-
dural safeguards by looking to the states' success in exempting themselves from federal
regulations. Id. at 1019 and n.17 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (1974) (police and firefighters
exempted from FLSA overtime provisions)). At the same time the states were success-
fully securing generous federal grants. Id. at 1020. (citing Urban Mass Transit Act of
1964, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618). However, there is no requirement that "regulation under
the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial benefits under
the Spending Clause." Id. at 1020 n.21.
229. "[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inher-
ent in all congressional action - the built-in restraints that our system provides
through state participation in federal governmental action." Id. at 1020.
230. Id. at 1021 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Court,2"1 most notably in Hodel and United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Railroad.
32
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion did not focus upon the
difficulty of identifying a traditional governmental function 33
but rather, viewed National League of Cities as essentially a
balancing test.2 3 4 Finding that operation of a mass transit sys-
tem was "indistinguishable in principle" from other traditional
services, 35 Justice Powell favored application of the balancing
feature of National League of Cities and its progeny to hold
that states have a "compelling" interest in controlling labor rela-
tions with their employees and balancing their budgets.23
Unconvinced that the structure of the federal government
adequately preserved state sovereignty,37 Justice Powell found
that the states' success in securing exemptions and funding was
231. Id. at 1021 n.1. Justice Powell distinguished National League of Cities' over-
ruling of Wirtz from Garcia's overruling of National League of Cities by observing that
"the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions."
Id.
232. Id. at 1021-22. In Long Island R.R., the Court applied the principles of Na-
tional League of Cities to unanimously hold that the operation of a railroad engaged in
interstate commerce was not a traditional government function. Thus, although the ac-
tivity involved was found to be non-immune, the application of the principles of Na-
tional League of Cities was not questioned. Id. (citing Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678
(1982)). See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
233. "[T]he luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and
applying the general provisions of our Constitution." Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1023 n.4 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). Traditional governmental functions are "the kinds of activities en-
gaged in by state and local governments that affect the everyday lives of citizens." Id. at
1031.
234. Id. at 1024 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)). See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
235. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell offered "pro-
viding and maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems" as examples of traditional services. Id. But see supra notes 213-14 and accompa-
nying text.
236. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting).
237. "Members of Congress are elected from the various States, but once in office
they are members of the federal government." Id. at 1025. Furthermore, the direct elec-
tion of senators, "the weakening of political parties on the local level, and rise of the
national media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative
of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various
national constituencies." Id. at 1025 n.9 (citing ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 50-51
(1984)).
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irrelevant to the resolution of constitutional matters.23 In short,
the states' theoretical ability to protect their own interests is of
no consequence" 9 since it is the Court's duty "to say what the
law is" with respect to the acts of Congress.2 40
Justice Powell faulted the majority not only for abdicating
its task of judicial review241 but also for pointedly ignoring the
tenth amendment.2 42 Justice Powell cited some of the same
sources as the majority to conclude that it was the tenth amend-
ment, and not the structure of the federal government, that was
designed to insure the continuing role of the states in the federal
system.2" 3
238. Id. at 1026. "[Political success is not relevant to the question whether the po-
litical processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional limitiations." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
239. Id. at 1026 n.12.
240. Id. at 1026-27 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
241. "The fact that Congress generally does not transgress constitutional limits on
its power to reach State activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to
rectify the cases in which it does do so." Id. at 1026. "This-Court has never before abdi-
cated responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of challenged action on the ground
that affected parties theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the
electoral process." Id. at 1026 n.12.
242. "[The majority makes] only a single passing reference to the Tenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 1023. "[Tlhe Court barely acknowledges that the Tenth Amendment ex-
ists." Id. at 1030. "The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case." Id. at 1030 n.16.
243. Id. at 1027.
In our federal system, the States have a major role that cannot be preempted by
the national government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the rat-
ifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitution was
predicated on this understanding of federalism. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment
was adopted specifically to ensure that the important role promised the States by
the proponents of the Constitution was realized.
Id.
"[E]ight States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be
adopted after ratification. All eight of these included among their recommendations
some version of what later became the Tenth Amendment." Id. (citing 1-4 DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (J.
Elliot 2d ed. 1854)).
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Govern-
ment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments
are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; .... The powers re-
served to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
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Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in Justice Pow-
ell's dissent and also wrote separate dissenting opinions.244 In his
brief dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that he was not in com-
plete agreement with the balancing analysis of Justice Powell
but felt that it was not "incumbent . . . [upon the] dissent to
spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am
confident, in time again command the support of a majority of
this Court. s24 Justice O'Connor also predicted that the rationale
of National League of Cities would be re-adopted 24 and wrote
separately to denounce the majority's view of federalism and to
criticize the Court for shirking its duty.
24 7
Justice O'Connor found that the Framers narrowly con-
strued the commerce power,2 48 and although she disavowed any
continued reliance upon such a narrow construction, her opinion
suggested that such construction explained the Framers' belief
that the Constitution "assured significant state authority" de-
spite Congress' broad powers. 49 Justice O'Connor noted that the
vehicle for expanding the commerce power to matters affecting
commerce was the necessary and proper clause25 0 and based her
criticism of the Garcia opinion upon the interpretation of that
clause embodied in McCulloch v. Maryland.2 5' Justice O'Connor
maintained that any federal regulation which failed to account
for state autonomy contravened the spirit of the tenth amend-
Id. at 1028. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
244. Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Id. at 1033-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1033, 1038.
248. Id. at 1034-35.
249. Id. at 1035.
This perception of a narrow commerce power is important not because it suggests
that the commerce power should be as narrowly construed today. Rather, it ex-
plains why the Framers could believe the Constitution assured significant state
authority even as it bestowed a range of powers, including the commerce power on
the Congress.
Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1036 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819)). "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
(emphasis in original) Id.
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ment and was therefore unconstitutioal.252 Justice O'Connor's
proposed test was essentially a balancing test that weighed state
autonomy as a factor in considering the scope of Congress' com-
merce power.2 53 In Justice O'Connor's view, the difficulty of ap-
plying the teaching of National League of Cities did not excuse
the Court from "assum[ing] its constitutional responsibility' 254
of stating "what the law is."
2 55
V. Analysis
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity,25 6 the Supreme Court disposed of a test for intergovernmen-
tal commerce clause immunity which it deemed "unwork-
able."2 5 7 The Court's position that the political process is the
"principal" limitation258 upon exercise of the commerce power is
in accord with that of a majority of the commentators.25 9
In the months following the announcement of the Garcia
decision, municipal interest groups lobbied intensively seeking
congressional relief from the economic impact 260 of that opin-
ion.2" 1 The municipalities succeeded in securing passage of the
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1037.
The proper resolution, I suggest, lies in weighing state autonomy as a factor in the
balance when interpreting the means by which Congress can exercise its authority
on the States as States. It is insufficient, in assessing the validity of congressional
regulation of a state pursuant to the commerce power, to ask only whether the
same regulation would be valid if enforced against a private party. That reasoning,
embodied in the majority opinion, is inconsistent with the spirit of our Constitu-
tion. It remains relevant that a State is being regulated, as National League of
Cities and every recent case have recognized .... As far as the Constitution is
concerned, a State should not be equated with any private litigant.
Id.
254. Id. at 1038.
255. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
256. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
257. Id. at 1007.
258. Id. at 1020.
259. See supra note 138.
260. Cf. supra note 132 (estimation of cost of compliance with 1974 FLSA
amendments).
261. See Cohodas, Congress Asked to Referee: Labor, Local Governments At Odds
on Overtime Pay, 43 CONG. Q. 1647 (1985); Cohodas, Public Employers, Unions Join
Forces: Fast Congressional Action Solves Worker Overtime Issue, 43 CONG. Q. 2379
(1985).
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1985 amendments to the FLSA which permitted them to com-
pensate their employees with time off in lieu of overtime pay. 26 2
These events lend credence to the majority's position that the
states are capable of protecting their own interests. 26 The dis-
sent, however, could only regard these events as not envisioned
by the Constitution and necessitated only by the Court's failure
to exercise its responsibility." 4
The Garcia Court could have reached its decision upon far
less sweeping grounds. The narrow question presented to the
Court was whether the operation of a mass transit system was a
traditional governmental function. The case had been briefed
and argued in accordance with the teaching of National League
of Cities v. Usery. The Court, sua sponte, raised the additional
question of whether the principles of that case should be recon-
sidered.26s Prior to its demise, the National League of Cities test
had been narrowly construed through application of the direct
impairment feature of the traditional governmental function
prong2" and through the introduction of an element of balanc-
ing.26 7 However, overruling National League of Cities in its en-
tirety was ill-advised inasmuch as there are functions, difficult to
define but well illustrated by the examples set forth in National
262. State workers may accrue compensatory time off at a rate of not less than 1.5
hours per hour of overtime worked. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Public safety,
emergency response and seasonal employees may accrue a maximum 480 hours of com-
pensatory time off and all other types of employees are limited to 240 hours. Any hours
worked in excess of these limits requires the payment of overtime compensation. 29
U.S.C. § 207(o)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
263. One congressional observer noted that:
Passage of the bill was one of the faster actions on major legislation in recent
years, demonstrating how quickly Congress can move when pressed by outside
forces with a common purpose.
In this case it was public employer groups - in particular, the National
League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association of
Counties-who wanted relief from the Feb. 19 Supreme Court decision. They
claimed the ruling, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, would
cost them more than $1 billion in overtime pay in the next year.
Cohodas, Public Employers, Unions Join Forces: Fast Congressional Action Solves
Worker Overtime Issue, 43 CONG. Q. at 2379.
264. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
265. 105 S. Ct. at 1010.
266. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
267. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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League of Cities,26 which are so intertwined with concepts of
state sovereignty269 that regulation by the federal government
offends the tenth amendment even in its status as a mere "tru-
ism." The Garcia Court should have disposed of the issue at
hand by invoking the teaching of United Transportation Union
v. Long Island Railroad, 2 1 to find that operation of a commuter
bus service was constitutionally indistinguishable from the oper-
ation of a commuter rail service.2 7' The necessary result of such
a finding would be a holding that SAMTA was not performing a
traditional governmental function and therefore was not im-
mune from commerce clause regulation. Had the Court followed
such a course, continued strict construction of National League
of Cities would have provided a viable means of immunizing
only those few functions which truly are attributes of state
sovereignty.272
The Garcia Court itself called for a reconsideration of the
National League of Cities test27 3 and the resulting opinion re-
flects a fundamental division in the Court over the true nature
of that test. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Blackmun
reasoned that the traditional governmental function prong was
flawed because it required members of the judiciary to make the
type of policy decisions which were the sole province of the leg-
islature.2 74 Furthermore, National League of Cities was wrongly
decided because there was no state sovereignty restraint upon
275Congress' commerce power.
268. See supra text accompanying note 124.
269. There is a qualitative difference between the types of services identified by the
National League of Cities Court as traditional and the operation of a mass transit sys-
tem. See supra note 268. Despite the National League of Cities Court's insistence that
the examples offered were "not ... exhaustive," National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
851 n.16, it is conceivable that the functions identified by that Court are sui generis.
270. 455 U.S. 678 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 146-53.
271. "It would be surprising, indeed, if the Tenth Amendment draws a constitu-
tional distinction between transporting commuters by bus as opposed to by train." Brief
for Appellant, Joe G. Garcia at 14, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
272. See supra note 269.
273. 105 S. Ct. at 1010.
274. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
275. "[W]e have no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty
when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause." Garcia, .105 S. Ct.
at 1017.
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Justice Blackmun, however, never explained why a court's
decision concerning a traditional governmental function is any
more legislative in nature than a wide myriad of other determi-
nations routinely made by courts. For instance, the finding of a
suspect classification is a necessary element of any equal protec-
tion analysis. Furthermore, in characterizing the test of Na-
tional League of Cities as involving a "state sovereignty" re-
straint upon the commerce power the Court pointedly avoided
any mention of the tenth amendment.276 Although the tenth
amendment is but a truism, it is not without significance27 7 and
indeed, no passage of the Constitution is to be dismissed as mere
surplusage.278 State sovereignty is not the "freestanding con-
cept"279 Justice Blackmun characterizes it as but a matter of
constitutional law enshrined in the tenth amendment and as
such it is entitled to the same recognition given to other Bill of
Rights protections.2 80
According to the majority, there are residual restraints upon
Congress when it legislates based on its authority under the
commerce clause.281 However, the Court offered little in the way
of guidance as to what those limits are. Thus the opinion leaves
Congress free to legislate as it sees fit within the scope of its
authority, limited only by the political process.112
The Garcia decision thus jeopardizes the increasingly fragile
notion of "state sovereignty." Although an argument can be
made that in this era of electronic communications and industri-
alization it makes sense to give the national government com-
plete control over the nation's economy, this is not the way our
government was designed to operate. The states were to be left
with areas in which they had clear authority to act without fed-
eral interference.2 8 The reason the Framers chose to leave
276. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
277. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547-48 n.7 (1975).
278. "It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be
without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
279. See supra note 275.
280. See supra note 129.
281. 105 S. Ct. at 1020. Justice Blackmun cited Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559
(1911) as an example. That case held that Congress cannot dictate to a state where to
locate its own state capital.
282. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
283. Id. at 1030 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7
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power to govern "the ordinary course of affairs"2"4 with the local
governments was their awareness that local government is gener-
ally more responsive to local needs and more immediately ac-
countable for its actions.2"5 The majority in Garcia is willing to
sacrifice that element of accountability by permitting the federal
government a broad grant of authority virtually unchecked by
judicial review.28
It is clear that the Framers intended that in the event of a
conflict, the Constitution should be superior to a statute, and
that it should be the Court that should decide whether or not
any given statute is constitutional. 287 That concept has been well
accepted in our jurisprudence since the early case of Marbury v.
Madison.2 88 After Garcia, Congress has been given an open door
to define its own authority under the commerce clause, thus
leaving only its own self-restraint to keep it in check.2 89 Given
the fact that today Congress appears to respond more to politi-
cal action groups and other lobbyists than to its members' con-
stituencies,290 the voice of the latter may go unheard. The major-
ity in Garcia gives no protection to those parties in the event of
a "malfunction of the 'political process.' ,21
Finally, the majority's reading of New York v. United
States292 is somewhat disingenuous. While the eight justices who
participated in that decision unanimously rejected the govern-
mental-proprietary distinction in the field of intergovernmental
Wall.) 71, 76 (1868)).
284. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
285. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 106-08 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
286. 105 S. Ct. at 1026-27 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Van Alstyne, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1720-22 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's yield to Congress, to constitutionally determine the boundaries of federalism,
means the "death of federalism").
287. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961):
[Tihe courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits as-
signed to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.... [T]he constitution ought to be preferred to the statute.
Id. at 525.
288. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
289. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290. See id. at 1025 and n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 1025 n.7.
292. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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tax immunity, no majority opinion was entered. It is difficult to
read the four separate opinions entered in New York v. United
States and arrive at a single unambiguous teaching. 93
Ironically, it is the Garcia dissenters who argue that Na-
tional League of Cities is, at its heart, a balancing test. The dis-
sent noted that the same statute, the FLSA, was at issue in both
National League of Cities and Garcia, and criticized Justice
Blackmun, who found the result in National League of Cities
was "necessarily correct" for not explaining why he found that
same result "necessarily wrong" in Garcia.294
The dissent's characterization of National League of Cities
as a balancing test29 ' is faithful to the formulation developed in
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association.96
A statute that would fail the three-part test developed in that
case may nevertheless be upheld due to an overwhelming federal
interest.97 A further reason for interpreting National League of
Cities as a balancing test is suggested in the separate dissent of
Justice O'Connor.2ee The traditional governmental functions at
issue in National League of Cities and its progeny do not in-
volve interstate commerce per se but rather are activities "af-
fecting" commerce.2 9 Therefore, Justice O'Connor applied the
teaching of McCulloch v. Maryland regarding the necessary and
proper clause and found that any test of the constitutionality of
a commerce regulation that equates a state with a private liti-
gant is inconsistent with the spirit of the tenth amendment.00
Under Justice O'Connor's proposed test, state autonomy would
be a factor to be "weigh[ed] .. .in the balance"30' when Con-
293. Chief Justice Stone's concurring opinion, joined in by three other justices,
maintained that a federal tax which was non-discriminatory upon its face, could never-
theless be unconstitutional as applied to the states. New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
at 587-88 (Stone, J., concurring). The two dissenters adopted a position which was even
more protective of states' rights. Id. at 590-98 cited in National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 843 n.13.
294. 105 S. Ct. at 1025 (Powell, J., dissenting).
295. See supra text accompanying note 234.
296. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
298. 105 S. Ct. at 1033-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 246-55 and
accompanying text.
299. See supra text accompanying note 250.
300. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
301. 105 S. Ct. at 1037.
19861
39
PACE LAW REVIEW
gress purports to regulate a state activity by means of the com-
merce clause.302
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, it would appear implicit, despite the major-
ity's protestation to the contrary,"' that the level of federal
grants to state and local governments influenced the Court's
opinion. The impact of Garcia is therefore likely to be magnified
by the effect of proposed reductions in federal aid to the cit-
ies.304 The Court's holding in Garcia was overly broad; the Court
would have acted more prudently had it reaffirmed National
League of Cities but limited its application by means of contin-
ued strict construction and a balancing of federal and state
interests.
Debra E. Young
Thomas G. Gardiner
302. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
303. Regulation pursuant to the commerce clause need not "be accompanied by
countervailing benefits under the Spending Clause." Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020 n.21.
304. Cf. Herbers, Leader of Cities League Calls Plan for Aid Cuts "Disastrous,"
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1986, at A20, col. 3.
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